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ABSTRACT
In the last decades, data have become a cornerstone component in
many business decisions, and copious resources are being poured
into production and acquisition of the high-quality data. This emerg-
ing market possesses unique features, and thus came under the spot-
light for the stakeholders and researchers alike. In this work, we
aspire to provide the community with a set of tools for making busi-
ness decisions, as well as analysis of markets behaving according to
certain rules. We supply, to the best of our knowledge, the first open
source simulation platform, termed Open SOUrce Market Simu-
lator (OSOUM) to analyze trading markets and specifically data
markets. We also describe and implement a specific data market
model, consisting of two types of agents: sellers who own various
datasets available for acquisition, and buyers searching for rele-
vant and beneficial datasets for purchase. The current simulation
treats data as an infinite supply product. Yet, other market settings
may be easily implemented using OSOUM. Although commercial
frameworks, intended for handling data markets, already exist, we
provide a free and extensive end-to-end research tool for simulating
possible behavior for both buyers and sellers participating in (data)
markets.
1 INTRODUCTION
In the last decades, data have become a cornerstone component in
many business decisions, and copious resources are being poured
into production and acquisition of the high-quality data. This emerg-
ing market possesses unique features, and thus came under the
spotlight for the stakeholders and researchers alike. Consider the
following case:
Example 1. A new content provider is stepping into the entertain-
ment industry, providing streaming media and video on demand. To
understand its target customers, the provider chooses to use the power
of data. Typical relevant data sources may include competing content
providers and complementary industries that may hold valuable in-
formation regarding potential customers. In terms of a data market,
the new provider has to decide which of the relevant datasets should it
purchase, when, and at what cost. Buying all the relevant datasets is
usually impossible as the initial budget usually is not sufficient, and
even if so, postponing the purchase may result in a drop in buying
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prices. However, having a consistent benefit from the retained datasets
may encourage the buyer to buy the datasets early, even if the supply
is infinite, making timing an important ingredient.
In this work, we aspire to provide the community with a set of
tools for making business decisions, as well as analysis of markets
behaving according to certain rules. We supply, to the best of our
knowledge, the first open source simulation platform, termed Open
SOUrce Market Simulator (OSOUM) to analyze trading markets
and specifically data markets. We also describe and implement
a specific data market model, consisting of two types of agents:
sellers who own various datasets available for acquisition, and
buyers searching for relevant and beneficial datasets for purchase.
The current simulation treats data as an infinite supply product. Yet,
other market settings may be easily implemented using OSOUM.
Although commercial frameworks, intended for handling data
markets, already exist (e.g., [1–5]), we provide a free and exten-
sive end-to-end research tool for simulating possible behavior for
both buyers and sellers participating in (data) markets. Our main
contribution can be summarized as follows:
• We provide a publicly available novel market simulation,
including a convenient method of adding custom behaviors
for both the sellers and buyers, as well as a wide variety of
possible contracts between the parties.
• We implement several baseline approaches to the following
tasks:
(1) Estimating market prices for data products,
(2) Choosing subset of these products to be procured, based
on price prediction and personal valuations
(3) Maximizing profit by purchase timingw.r.t. market prices
We begin by describing OSOUM (Section 2) and discussing re-
lated work on data markets (Section 3). Then, we provide an OS-
OUM proof-of-concept handling data trading (Section 4).
2 THE OSOUM FRAMEWORK
Wenowdescribe ourmarket simulation framework,OSOUM, which
is publicly available at https://github.com/shraga89/RGA. UsingOS-
OUM, researchers can flexibly implement different market scenar-
ios in various settings, run simulations, analyze markets behaviour
and more. OSOUM is composed of players, products, and simulator.
We distinguish between two main types of players: buyers and
sellers. Generally, both share most functionalities, including price
setting, strategy, budget, etc. In addition, each player stores a his-
tory of transactions to make flexible use of past interactions for
future decisions. OSOUM allows players to employ different strate-
gies with regard to any decision made, may it be market price
prediction, choosing which goods to sell/purchase, price setting or
something else. Strategies can be either picked from an existing
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The simulation supports both consumable and non-consumable
products, as well as items with finite and infinite supplies, e.g.
physical and digital goods respectively.
OSOUM also allows different market rules and various types
of contracts between players. For example, a simple supply and
demand market simulation (finite supply) without auctions is imple-
mented as a simple interaction between seller and buyers (randomly
assigned pairs at each timestamp). In this setting a transaction oc-
curs if the buying price exceeds the selling price; accordingly, the
budgets of the buyers and sellers are updated as well as the inven-
tory. OSOUM also supports selling via various types of auctions
and provides the tools for easy addition of other forms of contracts
and financial instruments.
3 RELATEDWORK
Before we dive into our proof-of-concept dealing with data mar-
kets, we now describe related work in the area. A variety of ap-
proaches and frameworks have addressed data markets. From a
commercial perspective, an abundant of frameworks exists, e.g.,
Dawex [1], Onaudience [2], Qlik [3], Tase [5] and snowflake’s data
exchange [4]). These frameworks act as mediators and enable trans-
actions between competing sellers and buyers. Using our suggested
data market simulation, buyers and sellers willing to use these
frameworks will have the opportunity to test and analyze their
strategies before committing to a real-world environment.
Originated in economics, where trading data has been ongoing
for more than 30 years now [13], research into data markets has
been a focus for other disciplines as well, such as data manage-
ment [9, 10, 12]. In game theory, the focus is on the theory of creat-
ing algorithmic solutions specifically tailored for data-like products,
and taking their unique traits (infinite replicability, combinatorial
value etc.) into account [6, 7]. In this work we focus on a market
setup simulation for be used for other researchers. In addition, while
other works use the characteristics of data (size, features, use in
ML framework, cleanness, etc.), we provide a proof-of-concept for
an infinite supply market, not limited to data products.
4 SIMULATING A DATA MARKET USING
OSOUM
In this section we give a concrete example of a market model that
can be faithfully simulated and investigated using OSOUM.
4.1 A Data Market Model
A data market M is a composition of three sets of entities, namely
buyers B, sellers S, and a mediator. We shall refer to the first two
entities also as the players G = B ∪ S in the market. Players may
be individuals or groups (e.g., companies or organizations) inter-
ested in trading datasets. We use D to denote the set of authorized
datasets in M. Usually, a dataset 𝑑 ∈ D is associated with a do-
main and several of other properties that represent it including e.g.,
the features it contains. Each buyer 𝑏 ∈ B is interested in a set
of datasets D𝑏 ⊆ D whereas each seller offers a set of products
D𝑠 ⊆ D. In addition, each player has a budget 𝐿𝑔 , which is updated
according to the transactions of a player. The mediator is in charge
of the transactions between the different players in the market.
Each player 𝑔 ∈ G has a different utility from a dataset and a
different perceived value, according to which it can set prices. A
market is a temporal ecosystem. We assume that the market has a
finite horizon 𝑇 and each interaction between the different entities
takes place in a discrete timestamp 𝑡 < 𝑇 . Each timestamp 𝑡 includes
a set of transactions supervised by the mediator.
Being a part of a data market, players must decide what is the
value of a dataset, i.e., how profitable is a dataset for them. Estab-
lishing a value for a dataset (and information goods in general) is
not easy [8, 13]. The core challenge in a competing market is that
the value of data is different for sellers and buyers. Sellers may
price a dataset reflecting e.g., the effort in gathering the data, while
buyers may choose the price they are willing to pay according to
their profit expectation. We separate the price of a product from it
valuation which are denoted as 𝑝𝑔 (𝑑) and 𝑣𝑔 (𝑑), respectively.
A transaction is when a buyer 𝑏 acquires a dataset 𝑑 from a seller
𝑠 . The buyer pays 𝑝 (𝑑), 𝐿𝑏 and 𝐿𝑠 are updated, and the buyer is no
longer interested in buying 𝑑 . The seller is still willing to sell 𝑑 , as
the inventory of a dataset is assumed to be unlimited. At the end of
each timestamp, buyers and sellers update their datasets pricing.
Example 2. Recall Example 1. Our content provider is denoted by
𝑏1. Let its relevant datasets be D𝑏1 = {𝑑1, 𝑑2}, and its initial budget
by 𝐿𝑏1 = 10. 𝑏1 price estimations are 𝑝𝑏1 (𝑑1) = 8 and 𝑝𝑏1 (𝑑2) = 4
and its valuations are 𝑝𝑏1 (𝑑1) = 3 and 𝑝𝑏1 (𝑑2) = 2.1 In this case,
𝑏1 cannot aim to buy both 𝑑1 and 𝑑2 and has to choose just one of
them. This decision may depend on the horizon and can be expressed
as 2𝑇 − 4 > 3𝑇 − 8. Then, for example, if 𝑇 < 4 then buying 𝑑2 is
more beneficial, yielding e.g., a profit of 3 compared to 2 for 𝑇 = 3.
However, for𝑇 > 4 its more beneficial to buy 𝑑1, yielding e.g., a profit
of 7 compared to 6 for 𝑇 = 5. If 𝑇 = 4, both will yield 4.
In practice, it is not always possible to purchase all the profitable
products because of either funds available being insufficient, or
because of pricing mismatch between a buyer and a seller. So a
choice must be made at each time point what are the datasets to be
bought immediately. We call this choice datasets allocation problem.
4.2 Datasets Allocation Optimization Strategy
The datasets allocation problem is defined with respect to a single
player 𝑔 before timestamp 𝑡 in the market horizon 𝑇 . Recall that
a player 𝑔 is associated with D = ⟨𝑑1, 𝑑2, . . . , 𝑑𝑛⟩ (set of relevant
datasets) and 𝐿 (budget). In addition, a dataset 𝐷𝑖 has an overall
valuation value 𝑣𝑖 = (𝑇 − 𝑡) · 𝑣𝑔 (𝐷𝑖 ). At timestamp 0, the set of
datasets D, its corresponding valuations 𝑉 and an initial 𝐿 are set.
While the valuation values of datasets stays constant throughout
the horizon, the D and 𝐿 change with respect to the interaction in
the market. The available datasets at time 𝑡 , D𝑡 , changes when a
player purchases a dataset and thus,D𝑡 ⊆ D𝑡 ′, 𝑡 ′ < 𝑡 andD0 = D.
The budget 𝐿𝑡 changes with respect to the revenue of purchased
products and costs.
At time 𝑡 the player has to select a subset of datasets D̄ ⊆ D𝑡−1
that maximizes her future revenues. To simplify the notation, we
denote that number of datasets available at time 𝑡 as𝑚 ≤ 𝑛. Let
𝐶 = ⟨𝑐1, 𝑐2, . . . , 𝑐𝑚⟩, 𝑐𝑖 ∈ IR and𝑊 = ⟨𝑤1,𝑤2, . . . ,𝑤𝑚⟩,𝑤𝑚 ∈ {0, 1}
1note that the valuations are acquired each timestamp, e.g., having 𝑑1 for 5 timestamps
yields a value of 15
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represent a realization of costs and win indicators of the relevant
datasets after timestamp 𝑡 has completed, respectively. In practice,
a player has to allocate a subset of products at the beginning of time
𝑡 . Thus, the player does not know the actual cost of datasets when
the dataset allocation takes place. Accordingly, the player has to
estimate the costs 𝐶 = ⟨𝑐1, 𝑐2, . . . , 𝑐𝑚⟩ and winning indicators ?̂? =
⟨?̂?1, ?̂?2, . . . , ?̂?𝑚⟩. Using these estimations, the datasets allocation









𝑐𝑖 · ?̂?𝑖 · 𝑋𝑖 ≤ 𝐿
𝑋𝑖 ∈ {0, 1} 𝑖 = 1, . . . ,𝑚.
(1)
Since ?̂?𝑖 ∈ {0, 1}, the size of D𝑡−1 can only decrease to the set
of product she estimates she would win, i.e., 𝑤𝑖𝑛(D𝑡−1) = {𝑝𝑖 ∈
D𝑡−1 |?̂?𝑖 = 1}. Denoting the size of 𝑤𝑖𝑛(D𝑡−1) as𝑚𝑤𝑖𝑛 , we can
modify the objective to be
∑𝑚𝑤𝑖𝑛
𝑖=1 (𝑣𝑖 −𝑐𝑖 ) ·𝑋𝑖 and the constraints to
be
∑𝑚𝑤𝑖𝑛
𝑖=1 𝑐𝑖 · 𝑋𝑖 ≤ 𝐿 and 𝑋𝑖 ∈ {0, 1} 𝑖 = 1, . . . ,𝑚𝑤𝑖𝑛 ., respectively.
Exploiting the resemblance to the Knapsack problem [11], one
can show that our problem is NP-hard (via a reduction) and use an
out-of-the-box solver, e.g.,Gurobi,2 to (optimally) solve the problem.
4.3 Simulating the Data Market
We present an example of data market simulation based on the
model defined in Section 4.1. The data market was implemented as
a part of OSOUM, and can effortlessly be extended to incorporate
far more sophisticated techniques.
4.3.1 Goods. In this context, the only type of product is a dataset.
As such, it stores the domain of the dataset, its size (in terms of
examples and features) as well as other information.
4.3.2 Buyers. Recall that buyers have different valuations for each
dataset (Section 4.1) and employ different cost estimation strategies.
One can restate the price prediction problem faced by a buyer as a
time series analysis problem. For sake for demonstration, we next
present some basic baseline buying techniques. We note that there
exist far more sophisticated methods, e.g., [7], which we leave for
future works. Let 𝑝1, 𝑝2, . . . 𝑝𝑡 be a sequence of market prices for a
dataset, we predict the value of 𝑝𝑡+1 using the following methods :
• last price (𝑝𝑡+1 = 𝑝𝑡 )
• mean price (𝑝𝑡+1 = 1𝑡
∑𝑡
𝑖=1 𝑝𝑖 )
• maximum price (𝑝𝑡+1 = max
𝑖=1,...,𝑡
𝑝𝑖 )
• minimum price (𝑝𝑡+1 = min
𝑖=1,...,𝑡
𝑝𝑖 )
• linear regression (𝑝𝑡+1 = 𝑓 (𝑝1, 𝑝2, . . . 𝑝𝑡 ))
Using the predicted prices, a buyer has to choose which products
to buy, since the buyers’ budget is limited, and buying everything
is rarely possible. Thus, a buyer picks the most valuable products as
described in Problem 1. In an auction-free market, the buyers do not
compete among themselves for a dataset. Accordingly, acquiring a
dataset depends solely on the interaction between the buyer and
potential sellers. Thus, Problem 1 does not need to consider winning
indicators, allowing us to use knapsack to solve the problem.
2https://www.gurobi.com/
Figure 1: Available funds of buyers with different cost esti-
mation strategies per turn. Values are averaged over 10 dif-
ferent simulations.
4.3.3 Sellers. In our setting, we focus on competing buyers as they
aim to maximize their utility. A buyer’s strategy, however, may be
strongly affected by sellers behavior; thus we cannot completely
ignore this issue. To demonstrate the verity of sellers in such setting,
we created a set of reasonable ad-hoc rules that dictate sellers’
behavior, without any guarantee of optimality. The implemented
sellers are as follows:
• Adaptive seller: increases price if she sold the product suc-
cessfully, and lowers the price otherwise.
• Linear seller: price is a linear function of time.
• Noisy variants of the sellers above, using Gaussian noise.
4.3.4 Methodology. We created a proof-of-concept experiment
based on an auction-free market. Let B and S be the buyers and
sellers, respectively. Each player in the market behaves indepen-
dently. For each dataset 𝑑 available in the market, each 𝑏 (such that
𝑑 ∈ D𝑡
𝑏
) is randomly assigned to a seller 𝑠 (such that 𝑑 ∈ D𝑠 ). Then,
we split into two cases:




and pays its selling price (𝐿𝑏 = 𝐿𝑏 − 𝑝𝑠 (𝑑)).
• If 𝑝𝑏 (𝑑) < 𝑝𝑠 (𝑑): the buyer does not obtain the dataset and
get allocated to a different seller.
Note that in both cases the dataset remains available for sale. The
process continues until no buyer is interested in acquiring this 𝑑 .
During a timestamp the set prices remain constant. Once it ter-
minates, each player has the opportunity to change its prices. For
example, if a seller did not sell any instance of a dataset it may
lower the price.
4.3.5 Example Results. Figure 1 presents a possible plot based on
a simulation outcome, referring to five types of buyers (see Sec-
tion 4.3.2). The y-axis represents the funds (or budget) available
to each buyer at timestamp 𝑡 . We do not provide a prior price es-
timation at 𝑡 = 0 and thus, the initial values of cost estimations
are drawn randomly. In what follows, we average the values over
10 different simulation runs to minimize the randomization effect.
We observe inferiority in the estimation performance of regression
based buyer. This may be explained due by the non-linear behaviour
of some of the sellers as well as the fact that a considerable amount
of data is needed for a reasonable regression model. Last price
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buyer is able to obtain a judicious cost estimations right from the
start and the costs do not change vastly between timestamps in our
configuration.
REFERENCES
[1] [n.d.]. Dawex. https://www.dawex.com/en/.
[2] [n.d.]. OnAudience. https://www.onaudience.com/.
[3] [n.d.]. Qlik Datamarket. https://www.qlik.com/us/products/qlik-data-market.
[4] [n.d.]. Snowflake Data Exchange. https://www.snowflake.com/data-exchange/.
[5] [n.d.]. Tase. https://www.tase.co.il/en/market_data.
[6] Daron Acemoglu, Ali Makhdoumi, Azarakhsh Malekian, and Asuman Ozdaglar.
2019. Too much data: Prices and inefficiencies in data markets. Technical Report.
National Bureau of Economic Research.
[7] Anish Agarwal, Munther Dahleh, and Tuhin Sarkar. 2019. A marketplace for data:
An algorithmic solution. In Proceedings of the 2019 ACM Conference on Economics
and Computation. 701–726.
[8] Raul Castro Fernandez, Pranav Subramaniam, and Michael J Franklin. 2020. Data
Market Platforms: Trading Data Assets to Solve Data Problems [Vision Paper].
(2020).
[9] Shuchi Chawla, Shaleen Deep, Paraschos Koutrisw, and Yifeng Teng. 2019. Rev-
enue maximization for query pricing. Proceedings of the VLDB Endowment 13, 1
(2019), 1–14.
[10] Lingjiao Chen, Paraschos Koutris, and Arun Kumar. 2019. Towards Model-based
Pricing for Machine Learning in a Data Marketplace. In Proceedings of the 2019
International Conference on Management of Data. 1535–1552.
[11] Richard M Karp. 1975. On the computational complexity of combinatorial prob-
lems. Networks 5, 1 (1975), 45–68.
[12] Paraschos Koutris, Prasang Upadhyaya, Magdalena Balazinska, Bill Howe, and
Dan Suciu. 2015. Query-based data pricing. Journal of the ACM (JACM) 62, 5
(2015), 1–44.
[13] Hal R Varian. 1997. Versioning information goods. Technical Report.
